

25 March 2009

Gasol

Year End	Revenue (£m)	PBT* (£m)	EPS* (p)	DPS (p)	P/E (x)	Yield (%)
02/08	0.0	(0.4)	(0.1)	0.0	N/A	N/A
03/09e	0.0	(4.0)	(0.5)	0.0	N/A	N/A
03/10e	0.0	(4.0)	(0.4)	0.0	N/A	N/A

Note: * PBT and EPS are normalised, excluding goodwill amortisation and exceptional items.

Investment summary: An early gas opportunity

Gasol is an early opportunity play in the gas value chain in the Gulf of Guinea. Its aim is to gather together what are at present unmonetised and previously marginal gas reserves in sufficient quantities to justify the liquefaction process for export to the lucrative LNG markets of Europe and elsewhere. Through its innovative technology, Gasol's projects will be quicker, smaller and cheaper than traditional LNG.

Strong partners and a strong team

Gasol is assembling partnerships with Afren and Sonagas (in upstream), Teekay Shipping (floating LNG and LNG shipping) and EDF, with access to markets in Europe and elsewhere. Although the Gulf of Guinea is a challenging region in which to do business, those with experience should reap due reward. Gasol's leadership has impressive credentials in LNG, and in conducting business in the region.

Government support


Gasol's primary focus is Nigeria, where the government has recently issued a Gas Master Plan (GMP), with the purpose of developing the large reserves of gas already discovered, and not at present being developed. It is a well structured approach. Gasol is working in the spirit of the GMP as an independent aggregator; negotiations for access to 3tcf of gas are well underway, which would be sufficient for an LNG project. In addition to Nigeria, discussions are at various stages in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo and Cameroon.

Valuation: A conservative approach

Given that Gasol is at an early stage, we base our valuation on a single project, that of independent aggregator of 3tcf in Nigeria. Our discounted cash flow model uses a 12.5% discount factor, and, given the project uncertainties including obtaining financing, we apply a project probability factor of 25% – we value Gasol at \$119m, or 8p per share. If the project succeeds, this gives a value of \$475m (32p a share). The present share price, 1.4p, implies a project probability of 4.4%. Gasol is working on various similar projects elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea, to which we have attributed no value.

Price 1.4p
Market Cap £15m

Share price graph



Share details

Code GAS
Listing AIM
Sector Oil & Gas
Shares in issue 1,029.33m

Price

52 week High 11.50p Low 0.475p

Balance Sheet as at 31 August 2008

Debt/Equity (%) N/A
NAV per share (p) 0.68
Net cash (£m) 3.0

Business

Gasol is an Africa-focused gas independent. The company aims to monetise gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa by aggregation, liquefaction and shipment to high-value markets worldwide.

Valuation

	2008	2009e	2010e
P/E relative	N/A	N/A	N/A
P/CF	N/A	N/A	N/A
EV/Sales	N/A	N/A	N/A
ROE	N/A	N/A	N/A

Revenues by geography

	Europe	US	Other
0%	0%	0%	0%

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Investment summary: An early gas opportunity

Company description

Gasol aims to be the premier independent Africa-focused gas company. It plans to monetise gas reserves that are otherwise stranded through the use of innovative technology and the bringing together of different companies involved in each stage: upstream gas discoveries, gas gathering systems and liquefaction, transport and marketing processes. Its primary projects are in Nigeria, where negotiations are at an advanced stage. It is developing several key relationships: in upstream with Afren and Sonagas to secure access to gas; with the oil and gas shipping company Teekay; with utility companies such as EDF as project participants and offtakers into the European market; and with state oil companies, in particular the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). In addition to Nigeria, discussions are at various stages in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo and Cameroon.

Sector positioning

The original approach to monetising gas reserves, which were close to either an industrial or a domestic market, was to construct a network of distribution pipelines, and there are numerous examples of this. In some cases, these networks have become very large (eg in the US, Europe and the UK). Where gas has been discovered away from an existing pipeline infrastructure or large centres of population, originally the gas would be flared or possibly reinjected into the field. The larger players have developed LNG (pages 4-5), but this comes at a minimum cost of \$5bn and consequently the concept of an integrated gas sector player has been the preserve of the majors. The capital expenditure required has been such that generally the business has been built on long-term sales contracts, providing the backing for financing.

The new element in Gasol's approach is to operate in a region without a pipeline infrastructure with a large number of pockets of gas, which are too small in themselves to justify LNG investment. Gasol is also developing gas liquefaction processes that are economic with lower gas reserves and lower capital cost. The majors might wish to compete in this market place; they have the expertise across the value chain, but generally they are looking for larger reserves. There are other groups also attracted by Nigeria's GMP, but their projects are no more developed than Gasol's and it remains to be seen if they have the same ability to bring such projects to fruition that Gasol's leadership can demonstrate.

Company management

The Gulf of Guinea is a challenging region in which to operate. That said, the company's leadership has extensive experience of getting gas projects off the ground in the region and in Nigeria in particular. It also has impressive relationships. Details are given on pages 7-8.

Sensitivities

The key to a project is to bring and keep all the elements together: sufficient gas supply, building the pipeline network to gather the gas, building the liquefaction plant, the specialist shipping, the eventual market and, critically, financing. On top of this, the company operates in the challenging environment that is the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally the viability of a project is subject to the usual

issues of output prices and input costs; our valuation (page 10), shows it to be reasonably robust based on a single typical project.

Financials

Gasol's published figures will present small scale preparatory work in the coming year, raising the necessary funds from strategic partners. Project preparation costs (Gasol estimates \$40-50m for each project) will be financed through a mix of strategic partners, participants and financial investors. A full 2mtpa project (costing in the order of \$1.7bn) would be financed through a mixture of equity and project finance, supported by long-term LNG offtake contracts.

Valuation

Given that Gasol's work is in the concept stage, we base our valuation on a typical single project, that of independent aggregator in Nigeria. The company's negotiations to gather enough gas from several local owners of gas, at present undeveloped, are well advanced, and the volumes in prospect (3tcf) justify an LNG project.

There are, however, major uncertainties in bringing this project together successfully. Therefore, in addition to the 12.5% discount factor in the discounted cash flow (DCF) model, we apply a project probability factor of 25%, valuing Gasol at \$119m, or 8p per share. In the coming year, these various uncertainties should be resolved and this project probability factor should rise. At 100%, the value would be \$475m (32p a share). In the case of success, projects elsewhere in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea would be anticipated. We have attributed no value to other projects in which the company is in various stages of discussion.

Company description/strategy

The gas problem...

Gasol's strategy derives from the difficulty of selling gas. Once oil has access to a good port, for example through a pipeline, it is generally highly marketable on the international oil market. But for gas, except in the form of LNG, there is no international market. Historically a gas discovery was considered at worst a failed exploration well and at best a nuisance. Gas can be discovered in three forms:

- As 'associated' gas; this is primarily an oil discovery with some gas.
- As 'rich' gas; this is primarily a gas discovery with some liquids.
- As a 'dry' gas reserve, with no oil.

The cheapest means of disposing of gas was to flare it, which was widely done with associated gas in the past. This is now generally outlawed. Other means of disposal include sale to local industry, involving the construction of delivery pipelines, and sale at a retail level, involving a more complex pipeline network. Gas can also be reinjected into the reservoir and in some cases this can assist oil production by keeping up pressure in the reservoir. However, as the oil in the reservoir is depleted, the proportion of gas rises and the process will become uneconomic at a certain point.

Where there is an established local market for the gas, a rich gas discovery is often favourably viewed. Subject to the additional cost of separating the liquids from the gas, the stream of liquids provides an easily realised additional source of revenue.

The most expensive solution is LNG. This involves:

- Pipelines to gather the gas from the field and to transport it to a port;
- Construction of plant to liquefy and transfer it to ships;
- Construction of specialist ships to transport the now liquefied natural gas; and
- Construction of a plant in the country of sale to gasify the LNG and a connection point to deliver it into the local network, or possibly direct to a large customer.

Typically the cost of this would be \$5-10bn and upward, and companies would commit to develop the upstream only when the end market had been identified and contracted to receive the gas.


More recently an international market for 'spot' LNG has developed, but the minimum unit of sale is an LNG cargo (now in the order of 135,000m³), so for the time being at least, this market will be the preserve of the major LNG companies. This is a strongly growing market; world trade in LNG was 120 million m³ in 2005 and is forecast to grow at 7% a year, according to the California Energy Commission.

... Creates the opportunity for Gasol

The LNG value chain has been dominated by the oil majors, which are ready and able to commit to large capital expenditures. The opportunity for Gasol arises from:

- Regional governments' keenness to eliminate gas flaring and to monetise a valuable resource.
- Innovative technology that makes smaller scale LNG viable.
- Increasing LNG demand, and with it, the interest of utility companies in securing more LNG supply and moving up the value chain.
- Gasol's strong relationships in the upstream, giving it access to stranded gas and its ability to bring together strategic partnerships across this value chain.

Exhibit 1: Value chain



Source: Gasol

Gasol's area of operations

Gasol focuses on the Gulf of Guinea. The region as a whole is considered to have over 200tcf of gas, 90% of which is in Nigeria. Other countries' reserves include Angola's 12.2tcf, Equatorial Guinea's 8.0tcf and Cameroon's 3.4tcf. Cote d'Ivoire, Congo and Gabon have reserves of less than 2.5tcf each.

Nigeria

Nigeria is of particular interest to Gasol. It is the dominant hydrocarbon player in the region, with a well established oil and gas industry that has a wide geographic coverage. Oil has played the primary role and because opportunities for the local use of gas have been limited, historically extensive quantities of gas have been flared. More recently, with large finds and the general development of the LNG industry, the major companies have developed LNG in Nigeria. There are now six LNG trains, with a seventh at an advanced stage. But due to the wide geographic spread of hydrocarbons, there remain numerous gas discoveries that fall outside economic gathering into the existing LNG infrastructure. Nigeria has been behind the curve in addressing the environmental issues arising from flaring, but the problem has now been recognised in the Gas Master Plan, drawn up by the government and published in early 2008.

The Gas Master Plan

The GMP is the first attempt of the Nigerian government to consider the long-term strategic objectives of the gas sector as distinct from its traditional concentration on oil. This is driven by recognition that:

- The country has considerable gas reserves, largely unused by the indigenous population and industry;
- Private sector capital is needed to develop these reserves; and
- Such capital will be attracted only with access to export markets.

Power shortages continue to hamper the country's economic growth. A total of 5GW is in place for a population of 130 million (the UK has 15 times as much for a population of less than half this).

The government realises that private sector capital is needed to fully develop the gas market and that this will be international. Therefore the GMP seeks to attract foreign investment in the sector, in particular the development of new reserves through exploration and the enhancement of the country's collection network into a co-ordinated national gas transmission network. The broad strategy is to attract capital through LNG export, but at the same time requiring cross subsidy of the less profitable domestic market. In summary:

- Gas owners are free to monetise reserves as they see fit provided at least 20% is provided for the domestic market.
- Prices will be \$1.00-1.50/mcf to domestic industry and \$0.50 to domestic power.
- Three franchise areas have been created. Private sector bidders have been invited to submit development plans to be the aggregator in each of these areas, with responsibility for building a pipeline aggregation network and a central processing facility.

- There will be legislation to provide for standard Gas Production Sharing Agreements and other upstream and mid stream fiscal incentives and reforms.
- There will also be legislation preventing the flaring of associated gas.

NNPC has recently issued tender documents for companies and consortia wishing to bid for aggregator status, and is looking to complete by mid-2009. Gasol estimates this timetable has slipped by three to six months.

Gasol's Nigeria strategy

Gasol's negotiations with various parties in Nigeria are at an advanced stage. It has several key relationships in place:

- It is in advanced stages of negotiation with several owners of gas, which is at present unmonetised.
- Gasol works closely with Afren, a leading African E&P independent, currently with 16 assets in six countries in Africa. Gasol has rights of first refusal over all gas discovered by Afren in these countries.
- Gasol has a strategic alliance with Teekay Corporation, a \$10bn shipping company, centred on the development of a unique liquefaction process.
- Gasol is in discussions with several strategic partners (such as EdF) and LNG offtakers as project participants and for the sale of LNG into the lucrative European and other global markets.
- It is working closely with NNPC.

Gasol has a two-pronged approach to developing business:

1. Given the uncertainties, and recognising that there are other contenders for aggregator status under the GMP, Gasol management's primary strategy is to secure a sufficiently large source of gas to justify an LNG investment (about 3tcf) through negotiations with several owners of at present unmonetised gas. In its development plans it is taking full heed of the GMP, the prices to local owners of gas, the requirement to provide gas into the local market, either for industrial use, power generation or domestic supply, and the prices set by NNPC. This volume of gas would be treated through an LNG process suited to this smaller gas reserve – a near-shore production system (NSPS).
2. Partners of Gasol may apply for Aggregator Status under the GMP. Good relationships are being established with NNPC. Should a key partner acquire aggregator status, this would be welcome. However, the GMP is new legislation and there are likely to be forces at work that could delay or even entirely hinder its introduction.

It is entirely practical to pursue both these strategies in parallel to secure access to gas. Projects will be shaped accordingly; a key issue is to ensure that the spirit of the GMP is respected.

A unique technical solution

Gasol has evaluated the feasibility of a 'near-shore production system' (NSPS) for gas liquefaction in shallow waters. It is based on floating modules, berthed and moored to a fixed and protected jetty. The fixed element stands in 15-16 metres of water and receives untreated gas by pipeline; all utilities, instrumentation, gas and LNG loading arms are fixed to it. The floating elements are the LNG pre-treatment and liquefaction barge and two LNG storage vessels. There is berthing space for the mooring of LNG export carriers.

The concept is predicated on already tried and tested technology, thereby minimising the development risks. The Wood Group-owned Nitrogen Dual Expander (NDX-1) liquefaction process design uses a proprietary, nitrogen refrigeration process that is simple, compact, energy efficient and flexible over a wide range of feed compositions. The NDX-1 liquefaction process is easy to operate, and will have a production scalability for this project of 2-6 million tonnes per annum of LNG. Mustang, a Wood Group company, has completed a feasibility study, commissioned by Gasol, to review, evaluate and optimise the NSPS design. Facility operation input was contributed by Teekay Gas Services. The NSPS feasibility study concluded that the design is technically sound and can be designed and built to industry accepted codes and standards.

While further detailed evaluation and feasibility of the NSPS needs to be conducted, the NSPS's total capex/opex estimates for the facility are competitive on a cost per tonne of LNG production capacity compared to other industry projects. The parties will jointly decide the timing to proceed to front-end engineering design (FEED), applied on identified gas reserves in the region. The project lead time from start of FEED to first delivery of LNG cargos is 3.5 to 4 years and is therefore an economic alternative to both onshore traditional LNG plants and floating LNG.

Project structure

Project structure will be project dependent. For example, for a 2mtpa project, a separate 'mid-stream' company (or possibly companies) would be set up to build and operate the pipelines and gathering system, and LNG processing plant. This company would acquire gas either from existing owners through an offtake agreement or through direct upstream equity interest by Afren. The company would enter into long-term forward contracts for the sale of LNG in European (or other) markets. The parties (upstream, shipping, gas offtakers and Gasol) would take equity positions in this company, with the proportions to be negotiated. The long-term forward LNG sales contracts would form the basis on which to secure financing for capital expenditure in the order of \$1.7bn.

Management

The Gulf of Guinea is a challenging region in which to bring projects to fruition. The company's leadership has extensive experience of getting gas projects off the ground and of the region.

Theo Oerlemans, chairman, has over 40 years' experience in gas and LNG, in the development and management of Shell's international gas and LNG business. As a director of Shell International Gas Ltd, he was involved in the development of LNG projects in Sakhalin, Oman, Brunei and

Malaysia. He was CEO of Nigeria LNG Ltd from 1993 to 1997, when he successfully brought Nigeria's first LNG train to fruition.

Soumo Bose, CEO, has had an extensive international career, spanning 23 years, most recently operating at senior levels in the BG Group, SHV Gas and Calorgas. He has lived and worked in Egypt, China, India, the UK, France and the Netherlands. He was CFO and BG's senior representative at Egyptian LNG, a \$2bn LNG joint venture.

Jean Vermeire, strategic adviser, is currently the non-executive chairman of Distrigas, a €4.5bn Belgian-based natural gas company. He worked for the Chevron Corporation for 17 years. Among other appointments, he is currently a member of the supervisory board of Nederlandse Gasunie and president of the Paris-based International Group of LNG Importers.

Ethelbert Cooper, strategic advisor and founding member of Afren, has been active in the African natural resources sector for over 25 years. During the 1980s he devised and led an initiative to restructure Liberia's then biggest industrial project, a \$600m iron ore mining company. He is a founding member and chairman of the Liberian International Development Foundation.

Gasol's **non-executive directors** have extensive relevant experience. **Osman Shahenshah, Afren CEO**, has 20 years of experience in oil and gas finance and capital markets and been actively involved in the African gas sector for more than 15 years. **Charles Osezua, chairman of the Owel-Linkso Group in Nigeria**, is an authority on the emerging West African gas market, championing gas utilisation and development initiatives in Nigeria for over 20 years. **Paul Biggs, senior partner of the specialised law firm Trinity International LLP**, is a project finance specialist and has worked on a number of substantial infrastructure projects across Africa. **Haresh Kanabar** currently holds seven directorships and has 20 years' experience in senior management of various companies and industries, including many AIM listed companies.

Mike Burdon, project director, Nigeria, was formerly commercial director of African LNG and has almost 30 years' experience in the energy sector, including Poten and Partners (UK) Ltd, Phillips Petroleum, Conoco, Hamilton Brothers, Oil Corporation, British Gas and Monument Oil and Gas.

Justin Harlow, head of corporate development, previously worked for TAQA, the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company. Before joining TAQA, Justin was a senior manager for Risk Capital, an energy consultancy based in New York, and BP International Supply and Trading and ERAS.

David Jackson, project finance director, was previously finance director of African LNG. He has over 20 years' experience in project finance, investment banking and private equity, including the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Standard Bank of South Africa and West LB.

Alan Hunt, project and technical coordinator, most recently worked with Afren plc, principally as the Okoro Setu Asset Manager. Prior to this, he spent over 30 years with Shell International Exploration and Production, with roles including chief engineer in Nigeria and MD of Shell Peru E&P.

Sundeep Mangat, senior manager – projects, has experience in the LNG market and the gas and power markets in the UK, Europe and North America. He previously held roles within Exxon Mobil and Centrica.

Sensitivities

Project risk

The key risks to this project are those of project management and keeping all the elements together, including:

- Sufficient gas supply – Afren, with full subsurface expertise, has checked the reservoir data of the target gas fields, but there is always risk in the process of reservoir estimation.
- Building the pipeline network to gather the gas and building the liquefaction plant – although the equipment is standard, this is taking place in a difficult environment and will need tight project management.
- Specialist shipping – hopefully this is standard in the hands of experts such as Teekay.
- The eventual market – the sales contracts will need to be negotiated.
- The financing of the mid-stream companies, based on the forward sales of LNG.
- Negotiations need to be concluded, with the upstream owners, with strategic partners and with the various project contractors.
- Additionally, the viability of the project is subject to the usual issues of output prices and input costs; the valuation (page 10) shows the project to be reasonably robust.

Financing risk

Financing the utility companies will be a significant challenge in the present market, but the nature of the project should attract the International Finance Corporation.

Political risk

Although there has been relative political stability in Nigeria recently, it is a country that has known disorderly regime change. There can be inconsistent application of law as well as bribery and corruption, while regulation and the judicial system can be unpredictable. Investors should not expect this to change over the lifetime of the project. That said, it is a country with much internal force for doing things properly; well developed personal contacts with the country's leaders, which Gasol's leadership has, will go a long way to ensuring that projects that are clearly in the interest of the country are not impeded. Gasol has plans to operate in several Gulf of Guinea countries, which will spread its political risk.

Foreign currency risk

The currencies of the region are in general non-convertible. Projects generally will depend on the foreign currency earnings generated from the international sale of LNG being available to meet the capital expenditure and loan repayment needs of the company. In Nigeria, the GMP recognises that international expertise in gas development can be attracted only with foreign currency earnings being protected, so intentions are sound at the outset. There is always the risk that some future event may put a source of foreign currency at risk of expropriation, but there is little actual experience of this in Nigeria. Investors might reasonably anticipate occasional short-term disruption, but not such as would jeopardise the project as a whole. In further projects, Gasol will take all reasonable measures to protect its flow of hard currency. Again, Gasol has plans to operate in several Gulf of Guinea countries, which will spread this risk.

Security risk

Historically there have been issues of security in the Niger Delta, where the company will be operating, including kidnapping. The more likely impact of this is temporary disruption, and we think that the project's economics are strong enough to weather such an event.

Valuation

Given that, at present, all is at the concept stage, we base our valuation on a typical single project, that of an independent aggregator, gathering enough undeveloped gas from several local owners. The company's negotiations are well advanced, and the volumes in prospect (3tcf) justify an NSPS project. LNG prices track crude oil prices and we base this valuation on an oil price of \$50 a barrel. We take a conservative approach to costs and to Gasol's negotiated offtake.

There are, however, major uncertainties in bringing this project together successfully. Therefore, in addition to the 12.5% discount factor in the DCF, we apply a project probability factor of 25%, valuing Gasol at \$119m, or 8p per share. In the coming year, these uncertainties should be resolved and this project probability factor should rise. At 100%, the value would be \$475m (32p per share).

The company will build its reputation in Nigeria and in the case of Nigeria success, projects elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea can be anticipated. We have attributed no value to such other projects, regarding which the company is in early discussions.

A 20% crude price drop to \$40/bbl reduces the value to \$41m, or 2.7p per share. The project is more robust to project cost increases; a 20% cost increase reduces the project value to \$92m, or 6p per share. The break-even point is a crude price of \$34.80/bbl or a cost increase of 87.5%. In the event of a one-year supply disruption, in which costs excluding gas purchase continue, the project value drops to \$72m, or 4.7p per share.

Exhibit 2: Valuation

	Valuation (\$m)	Pence per share
Base case	119	8.0
With project certainty	475	32.0
Costs 20% up	92	6.0
Oil prices \$40/bbl	41	2.7
One year's supply disruption	72	4.7

Source: Edison Investment Research

Financials

Gasol's published figures will present small scale preparatory work in the coming year, over which period the company will need to raise £4m. This will be sought from strategic partners, and is shown as short-term debt. As projects become firmer and project participants are committed, project preparation costs (Gasol estimates pre-FID costs for each project at \$40-50m) will be financed through a mix of strategic partners, project participants, and by financial investors such as DFIs, Africa-focused funds. A full project for 2mtpa would cost in the order of \$1.7bn and would be financed through a mixture of equity and project finance, including development institutions, supported by long-term LNG offtake contracts.

Exhibit 3: Financials

Note: Year end changed to March FY09. The 2008 figures have been adjusted to reflect the acquisition of African LNG Limited; please refer to the Gasol 2008 Interim Statement for further detail.

Year end 28 Feb/31 Mar	£'000s	2008 IFRS	2009e IFRS	2010e IFRS
PROFIT & LOSS				
Revenue		0	0	0
Cost of Sales		0	0	0
Gross Profit		0	0	0
EBITDA		(427)	(4,000)	(4,000)
Operating Profit (before GW and except.)		(427)	(4,040)	(4,040)
Intangible Amortisation		0	0	0
Exceptionals		0	0	0
Other		0	0	0
Operating Profit		(427)	(4,040)	(4,040)
Net Interest		1	40	0
Profit Before Tax (norm)		(426)	(4,000)	(4,040)
Profit Before Tax (FRS 3)		(426)	(4,000)	(4,040)
Tax		0	0	0
Profit After Tax (norm)		(426)	(4,000)	(4,040)
Profit After Tax (FRS 3)		(426)	(4,000)	(4,040)
Average Number of Shares Outstanding (m)		848.7	850.6	1,029.3
EPS - normalised (p)		(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.4)
EPS - FRS 3 (p)		(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Dividend per share (p)		0.0	0.0	0.0
Gross Margin (%)		N/A	N/A	N/A
EBITDA Margin (%)		N/A	N/A	N/A
Operating Margin (before GW and except.) (%)		N/A	N/A	N/A
BALANCE SHEET				
Fixed Assets		0	2,250	2,200
Intangible Assets		0	2,000	2,000
Tangible Assets		0	250	200
Investments		0	0	0
Current Assets		125	1,100	1,200
Stocks		0	0	0
Debtors		16	400	500
Cash		109	700	700
Current Liabilities		0	(900)	(5,000)
Creditors		0	(900)	(1,000)
Short term borrowings		0	0	(4,000)
Long Term Liabilities		(74)	0	0
Long term borrowings		(74)	0	0
Other long term liabilities		0	0	0
Net Assets		51	2,450	(1,600)
CASH FLOW				
Operating Cash Flow		(456)	(4,000)	(4,000)
Net Interest		1	0	0
Tax		0	0	0
Capex		0	0	0
Acquisitions/disposals		0	0	0
Financing		550	4,665	0
Dividends		0	0	0
Net Cash Flow		95	665	(4,000)
Opening net debt/(cash)		60	(35)	(700)
HP finance leases initiated		0	0	0
Other		0	0	0
Closing net debt/(cash)		(35)	(700)	3,300

Source: Company accounts/Edison Investment Research

Growth	Profitability	Balance sheet strength	Sensitivities evaluation	
N/A	N/A	N/A	Litigation/regulatory	■
			Pensions	○
			Currency	○
			Stock overhang	○
			Interest rates	○
			Oil/commodity prices	●

Growth metrics	%	Profitability metrics	%	Balance sheet metrics		Company details	
EPS CAGR 06-10e	N/A	ROCE 09e	N/A	Gearing 09e	N/A	Address:	
EPS CAGR 08-10e	N/A	Avg ROCE 06-10e	N/A	Interest cover 09e	N/A	40 New Bond Street London W1S 2RX, UK	
EBITDA CAGR 06-10e	N/A	ROE 09e	N/A	CA/CL 09e	N/A	Phone	020 7290 3300
EBITDA CAGR 08-10e	N/A	Gross margin 09e	N/A	Stock turn 09e	N/A	Fax	020 7504 8631
Sales CAGR 06-10e	N/A	Operating margin 09e	N/A	Debtor days 09e	N/A	www.gasolplc.com	
Sales CAGR 08-10e	N/A	Gr mgn / Op mgn 09e	N/A	Creditor days 09e	N/A		

Principal shareholders		%	Management team
African Gas Development		50.8	CEO: Soumo Bose
Afren PLC		21.3	Soumo Bose has had a 23-year career, including work in Egypt, China, India, the UK, France and the Netherlands. He was CFO at BG Group's Egyptian LNG, and held senior positions at SHV Gas. He has worked with leading brands such as Calorgas and Primagaz.
Synergy Holdings Ltd		7.3	
			Nigeria Project Director: Mike Burdon
			Mike Burdon has 30 years' experience in the energy sector, including Poten and Partners (UK) Ltd, Phillips Petroleum, Conoco, Hamilton Brothers Oil Corporation, British Gas and Monument.
Forthcoming announcements/catalysts		Date *	Chairman: Theo Oerlemans
Preliminary results		May	
Interims		November	Theo Oerlemans has 40 years' experience in gas and LNG. For Shell, he was involved in LNG development in Sakhalin, Oman, Brunei and Malaysia. He was CEO of Nigeria LNG Ltd from 1993 to 1997, bringing Nigeria's first LNG train to fruition.
<i>Note: * = estimated</i>			

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